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Modelling and Analysis of Asymmetrical Latency
in Packet-Based Networks for Current Differential
Protection Application
Steven M. Blair, Member, IEEE, Campbell D. Booth, Bram De Valck, Dominique Verhulst, and Kin-Yee Wong
Abstract—Current differential protection typically requires
symmetrical communications channels—with equal latency in
each direction—for correct operation. Conventionally, this has
been delivered using protocols such as IEEE C37.94 over a
Time-Division Multiplexing (TDM) wide-area network (WAN).
Modern packet-based WANs offer improvements in efficiency,
flexibility, and cost-effectiveness for utility applications. However,
jitter is unavoidable in packet-based networks and, in extreme
cases, jitter inevitably results in substantial asymmetrical latency
in communications paths. This paper clearly defines how a
new source of asymmetry arises due to the use of “de-jitter”
buffers, which can jeopardize critical protection services. This
is demonstrated using an analytical modelling approach, which
precisely quantifies the degree of risk, and through real-time
demonstration with actual devices, involving current differential
protection over an IP/MPLS WAN. Using a novel method of real-
time manipulation of Ethernet traffic to emulate large WANs,
the modelling approach has been validated. It is shown how
the sensitivity of relays to asymmetry depends on the protection
settings and the magnitude of the measured load current. To
address the risk of protection maloperation, a new approach for
compensating for asymmetrical latency has been comprehensively
validated. These developments will be of immediate interest to
utilities operating, or migrating to, a packet-based infrastructure.
Index Terms—Communications, current differential pro-
tection, IEEE C37.94, IP/MPLS, power system protection, te-
leprotection, time synchronization, wide-area networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
P
ACKET-BASED networks are being increasingly adopted
by electrical utilities for monitoring, controlling, and
protecting critical grid infrastructure [1], [2]. This is due to:
packet-based networks offering several operational benefits;
the lack of availability of leased Time-Division Multiplexing
(TDM) services; the decline of expertise and availability of
legacy technologies; and network infrastructure cost opti-
misations [3]. However, many protection relays installed in
transmission and distribution system substations worldwide
still use TDM-based protocols such as IEEE C37.94 [4] for
delivering current differential protection (often referred to as
teleprotection) rather than packet-based methods such as using
IEC 61850 [5]. These legacy installations must continue to be
supported for many years, and therefore must integrate with
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packet-based wide-area networks (WANs)—without adversely
affecting protection performance.
In many cases, accurate time synchronization met-
hods—such as using a GPS clock or distributing time with the
IEEE 1588 Precision Time Protocol (PTP)—are not available,
and would be impractical or too expensive to deploy. Instead,
a simpler method for time synchronization, using the same
communications channel as for protection data, must be used;
as shown in this paper, this method has a significant weakness
when applied in modern packet-based WANs.
Jitter is unavoidable in practical packet-based communica-
tions networks [6], due to variable queuing latency and other
factors. Jitter results in fluctuating differences between the
“forward” and “reverse” latency, i.e., it creates the presence
of asymmetrical latency. Although, packet-based technologies
such as Multiprotocol Label Switching (MPLS), along with
careful traffic engineering and the use of standardized Cir-
cuit Emulation Services (CESs), can minimize jitter and the
associated asymmetrical latency, there are still cases where
jitter can cause subtle issues which can disrupt protection
schemes, as explained and demonstrated fully in this paper.
This can potentially lead to a degraded operational state of the
protection scheme or, in the worst case, result in the accidental
tripping of cables or transmission lines during benign, non-
fault conditions.
The main contribution of this paper is to isolate and
analyse a new source of communications asymmetry which
caused by the use of de-jitter buffers. This work will thereby
provide confidence for electrical utilities seeking to provide
teleprotection services over packet-based WANs, by clearly
illustrating the potential problems arising from jitter, quan-
tifying the impact, and validating this work using real-time
simulation with a representative IP/MPLS WAN. The paper
builds on the contributions of [7]. One of the key findings is
that jitter is a significant issue during the initialization of a
CES over packet networks, and the buffers associated with a
CES must be carefully monitored and adjusted. Similarly, CES
restoration after a connection failure in the communications
network can be prone to the same jittery conditions, potentially
inducing latency asymmetry. It should be noted that the
method described in this paper does not eliminate jitter or
asymmetry from the communications network; instead, the
paper demonstrates how to provide a high level of resilience
to even extreme levels of of jitter or asymmetry.
Although the examples presented in this paper are based on
UK transmission systems and conventions, this phenomenon
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Fig. 1: Illustrative two-terminal differential protection scheme
has applicability to utilities worldwide wishing to efficiently
integrate teleprotection services using modern packet-based
networks. The term “false trip” is used in this paper to
denote these conditions where protection maloperation could
occur; however the specific protection policy and available
equipment (such as the provision of a redundant backup
primary protection system) will define the actual result.
II. PROBLEM DEFINITION
A. Time Synchronization Requirements
Current differential protection systems, as illustrated in Fig.
1, require that current phasors measured at each terminal
are synchronized or time-stamped. This is essential so that
each protection relay can properly compare local and remote
phasor measurements. If necessary, relays “rotate” the current
phasors received from the remote end(s) of the scheme, by an
amount corresponding to the communications latency. Because
of the polarity of connected current transformers (CTs), the
two measured current phasors are 180º out of phase under
normal load conditions, such that the vector sum would be
close to zero [8].
Many teleprotection schemes use the simple “ping-pong”
protocol to estimate the communications path latency [9].
The required timing information is transmitted along with the
current phasor data [3]. This approach calculates the average
of the round trip latency, and it therefore assumes symmetrical
latency; the presence of asymmetrical latency will introduce an
error in the estimated path latency. The reliance on the ping-
pong protocol—which must be supported for many years—is
the critical mechanism which can lead to false trips, and
underpins the rest of the work presented in this paper.
The use of GPS to provide a better quality of time synchro-
nization—eliminating the issue of asymmetrical latency—is
often not reliable [10] or is susceptible to jamming or other
interference [11]–[13]. The IEEE 1588 Precision Time Proto-
col (PTP) can be used as an alternative but requires hardware
support, such as transparent or boundary clock functionality
within every node, throughout the entire communications
network to be effective. Therefore, PTP can be relatively
expensive to implement if not supported by the existing
network infrastructure, and if a network overhaul is not due
in the short term.
B. Characteristics of Packet-Based Networks
Assuming a WAN is correctly configured to use appropriate
Quality of Service (QoS) and traffic engineering techniques to
ensure forward and reverse traffic use the same path, there are
still opportunities for jitter—i.e. variation in packet latency
over time—to occur [7], [14]. The causes include:
• Head-of-line (HOL) blocking [15], where a high-priority
packet is delayed due to another packet which is already
being transmitted on the same egress port. This impact
on random latency is worsened by the presence of large
packets and by links with relatively low data rates.
For example, a 10 Mbps Ethernet link could potentially
experience an order of magnitude greater jitter compared
to a 100 Mbps Ethernet link when HOL blocking occurs.
• Networks where part of the underlying communications
infrastructure includes TDM-based links, e.g., transpor-
ting MPLS over E1. This means that packets must wait
for the next available TDM time slot before being trans-
mitted, resulting in random latency.
To absorb jitter in packet networks, a CES such as Structure-
Agnostic TDM over Packet (SAToP) [16] and Circuit Emu-
lation Service over Packet Switched Network (CESoPSN)
[17], must be established across the WAN. This requires
the use of special “de-jitter” buffers to regulate the flow of
data. The de-jittter buffer is used to control the egress of
data from the WAN to the protection relays, to ensure that
a consistent stream of data is delivered, and mimicking a
circuit-switched connection. However, asymmetrical latency
can still occur in these arrangements. The de-jitter buffer must
be initialized, or “primed”, with data when the teleprotection
service is started. Any communications jitter (i.e., random
deviations from the mean latency) experienced during this
initialization period can be critical, and may result in the buffer
“playing-out” data too early or too late. This is because buffers
will play out when half-full, and “bursty” traffic resulting
from excessive jitter may result in the egress buffer initiating
its data output slightly early. Accordingly, there can be an
inconsistency in the buffer residency time for the forward
and reverse directions, which would be present until the
service was stopped and reinitialized, resulting in a permanent
asymmetry—which is clearly unacceptable for a teleprotection
service. If the difference in the forward and reverse buffer
residency times was substantial, a false trip could occur due
to the latency asymmetry. Therefore, counter-intuitively, the
buffering required by the CES can actually cause additional
asymmetry.
Fig. 2 illustrates this process, in a simplified manner, for
two data streams: without jitter, and with jitter. Without jitter,
at stage t1 the buffer reaches its halfway point and begins
outputting data to the receiving protection relay; with jitter, this
occurs slightly later. Therefore, the time that the first packet
spends in the buffer depends on the random delay (within
certain limits) caused by jitter. This phenomenon is explained
in further detail in [15], and is noted for SONET applications
in [18]. This effect can also occur due to clock drift, where a
clock frequency error at either edge router in the WAN causes
a phase error to be accumulated over time, as demonstrated
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Fig. 2: Example of jitter causing degraded state of a CES de-jitter buffer
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Fig. 3: Typical current differential protection characteristic
in [7]. Note that this is different to the issue of excessive
instantaneous jitter over- or under-filling a de-jitter buffer; this
is assumed to be controlled by correctly engineering the buffer
size during commissioning, and is not the primary concern of
this paper.
C. Modelling the Impact of Asymmetrical Latency
Although there is some guidance on asymmetrical latency
for protection applications in the literature—such as maintai-
ning asymmetry <200-750 µs in [19], or <500 µs as given in
[20]—there is no agreement on the precise level of allowable
asymmetry for a particular utility’s requirements, and no
existing analytical approach to clearly define the issue. Similar
analysis is given in [21] and [8] (for the alpha-plane current
differential method), but not in the context of packet-based
networks. This section formally addresses this, by generically
deriving the theoretical maximum asymmetrical latency that
can be tolerated for any given utility deployment of current
differential protection.
The well-known characteristic for current differential pro-
tection is illustrated in Fig. 3 [9]. More advanced characte-
ristics have been proposed [8], [22], but Fig. 3 represents the
commonly-implemented approach. In this arrangement, Idi f f
is the vector sum of the local and remote current phasors, and
Ibias is the sum of the local and remote current magnitudes
divided by two. There are four protection settings which will
be selected based on the requirements for a particular scheme.
Table I gives typical settings for a 400 kV transmission line
protection scheme in the UK.
TABLE I: Current differential protection settings
Setting name Symbol Typical value Value for high sensitivity to
asymmetrical latency
Minimum pickup
current
Is1 400 A 400 A
Bias current
threshold
(breakpoint)
Is2 4000 A 4000 A
Lower percentage
bias setting (slope)
k1 30% 0%
Higher percentage
bias setting (slope)
k2 150% 150%
The following analytical method determines the sensitivity
of a protection scheme to asymmetrical delay caused by
degraded de-jitter buffers as explained in Section II-B. Current
phasors IA and IB (see Fig. 1) can be defined as follows (for
simplicity, only a single phase is considered but the method
applies to three-phase schemes):
IA = IAm∠IAθ = IAm cos IAθ + jIAm sin IAθ
IB = IBm∠IBθ = IBm cos IBθ + jIBm sin IBθ
Idi f f is the magnitude of the vector sum of IA and IB,
which can be calculated from the real (re) and imaginary (im)
components as follows:
Idi f f =
√
(re(IA)+ re(IB))
2+(im(IA)+ im(IB))
2
=
√√√√ (IAm cos IAθ + IBm cos IBθ )2
+
(
IAm sin IAθ + IBm sin IBθ
)2
Protection Relay A is used as a reference and therefore IA
has a phase of 0º; by convention, under normal operation, the
phase of IB should be 180º such that Idi f f is close to zero.
Therefore, Idi f f can be simplified as follows:
Idi f f =
√(
IAm + IBm cos IBθ
)2
+
(
IBm sin IBθ
)2
Asymmetrical latency only affects the phase of the current
measurements, and therefore it can also be assumed that both
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IA and IB have the same magnitude, i.e., IAm = IBm . Therefore,
Idi f f can be further simplified as given below:
Idi f f =
√(
IAm + IAm cos IBθ
)2
+
(
IAm sin IBθ
)2
=
√
IAm
2
(
2cos IBθ +2
)2
=
√
4 IAm
2 cos 2
(
IBθ
2
)
= 2IAm
∣∣∣∣cos
(
IBθ
2
)∣∣∣∣
Assuming the load current is within the first region of the
differential protection characteristic (i.e., IAm < Is2) and that
k1= 0%, a trip will occur when Idi f f ≥ Is1, as follows:
2IAm
∣∣∣∣cos
(
IBθ
2
)∣∣∣∣ ≥ Is1
This expression can be rearranged to a simple equation for
calculating the exact value of IBθ which would result in a trip,
as follows:
IBθ ≥ 2cos
−1
(
Is1
2IAm
)
(1)
Using this equation, for a load current magnitude of 3900 A
(i.e., IAm = 3900 A), a value of IBθ of 185.88º or 174.12º (i.e. a
phase error of 5.88º) would cause a trip. At a 50 Hz nominal
frequency (with a period of 20 ms), this equates to a time
error of 326.6 µs (= 5.88° × 20 ms ÷ 360°). However, for the
relays to erroneously rotate current vectors by a given angle,
the actual asymmetry (or the aggregate of the asymmetry in
each path) must be twice the value obtained using (1). This
is because the “ping-pong” time synchronization algorithm
used by the relays calculates the total round-trip latency,
which is divided by two to estimate the propagation latency in
one direction [23]. Therefore, including this aspect, the time
threshold for a false trip due to asymmetry in one direction,
tasym, can be calculated as follows (with angles expressed in
radians):
tasym = 2
0.02
2pi
(
pi −2cos−1
(
Is1
2IAm
))
= 0.02
(
1−
2
pi
cos−1
(
Is1
2IAm
))
(2)
Therefore, for the “high-sensitivity” settings given in Table
I, an asymmetrical latency of approximately 653 µs would
result in a false trip. It should be stressed that these are not
practical settings, but have been selected to better illustrate
the problem in Section III. Note that the current bias has
been ignored in the above analysis (because k1 = 0%), but
the full expression is given in (3) (where Fnom is the nominal
system frequency) which can be simplified to (4) under the
assumption that Ibias = IAm . Note that other factors, such as line
charging current, can contribute to the apparent asymmetry and
therefore, in practice, the value for tasym which can be tolerated
is the total of all such factors.
Fig. 4: Behavior of tasym for various Is1, IAm , and k1 values
tasym =
1
Fnom
(
1−
2
pi
cos−1
(
k1 |Ibias|+ Is1
2IAm
))
(3)
=
1
Fnom
(
1−
2
pi
cos−1
(
k1 IAm + Is1
2IAm
))
=
1
Fnom
(
1−
2
pi
cos−1
(
1
2
(
k1+
Is1
IAm
)))
(4)
Fig. 4 illustrates the behavior of tasym for various Is1, IAm ,
and k1 values. In summary, a small ratio of
Is1
IAm
(i.e. the ratio
of setting value to the current magnitude) will tend to be
sensitive to asymmetrical latency. It is especially important to
note that the level of risk of relay maloperation is dependent
on the magnitude of measured load current; at times of
higher loading—but below the Is2 setting—the system is more
susceptible to maloperation due to asymmetry or other factors
such as current transformer (CT) saturation errors.
The method provides a very clear and simple way for
utilities, system integrators, and other contractors to calculate
the risk of protection maloperation under different conditions,
for both existing and planned schemes.
III. REAL-TIME VALIDATION
A. Overview
To validate the model for asymmetrical latency presented in
Section (II-C) under realistic conditions, real-time simulations
with hardware-in-the-loop equipment have been performed.
The use of real-time testing, rather than using a communi-
cations simulator such as OMNET++ [24], guarantees that all
elements of the system—including the protection relays, WAN
routers, and protocol encoding—behave exactly as would
occur in a practical application.
The laboratory demonstration arrangement is shown in Fig.
5. This includes a Real Time Digital Simulator (RTDS) to
realistically simulate a representative power system (as given
in Fig. 1) in real-time, and commercially-available IP/MPLS
routers and protection relays. The RTDS supplies analogue
current waveforms to the protection relays. This is described
further in the following subsections.
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Fig. 5: Laboratory demonstration arrangement
B. Real-Time Jitter Injection
To deliberately induce jitter and asymmetry, it is required to
manipulate packets in real-time during initialization of a tele-
protection CES. The packet manipulation has been performed
using two methods:
1) Forcing static asymmetrical paths, with a fixed, con-
trolled latency in each direction. I.e. the asymmetry
is gradually increased until the relays (falsely) trip.
This simple method allows the theoretical asymmetry
limit which results in false trips (which can be readily
calculated, as given in Section II-C) to be validated
directly.
2) Delaying each packet by a random amount, according
to a given distribution. For simplicity, a Gaussian distri-
bution is assumed in this paper; for improved realism,
other distributions or approaches could be used, such as
the method described in [25]. This means that, unlike
Method 1, each direction of traffic experiences the same
mean latency, but can experience instantaneous asym-
metry. This should better approximate realistic network
conditions, albeit with significant jitter, compared to
Method 1.
For both methods, the XMOS xCORE embedded platform [26]
has been used to precisely control packet latency in real-time.
This platform uses a specialized mircocontroller architecture
which multiplexes the CPU between multiple logical cores, but
with dedicated hardware CPU registers per core. Therefore,
extremely low event response times are possible, which is
essential for enabling deterministic applications. The platform
also has the benefit of being cost-effective and allows multiple
Ethernet interfaces to be connected and controlled [27].
As described in [7], other methods can be used for arti-
ficially creating asymmetrical latency in an actual IP/MPLS
network, but are not required in this paper:
1) Traffic congestion due to multiple CESs over shared
TDM-based E1 links, with limited bandwidth. However,
this is unrealistic because the competing services should
not have the same priority in a properly configured
network.
TABLE II: Comparison of theoretical and measured maximum
asymmetry
Setting Theoretical max
asymmetry, tasyn (ms)
Measured max
asymmetry (ms)
k1 = 0% 0.653 0.604
k1= 30% 2.58 2.62
2) Clock drift due to deliberate loss of frequency synchro-
nization between MPLS nodes. However, this approach
is time-consuming to repeat.
Furthermore, for both alternative approaches, it is difficult to
measure the asymmetry being injected.
C. Automated Testing Methodology
Due to the stochastic nature of the impact of jitter on a
teleprotection CES, multiple test iterations (e.g. 100 iterations)
must be performed to check for false trips using Method 2.
Therefore, the laboratory devices shown in Fig. 5 need to be
controlled automatically. This has been achieved by using a
Python script to control and monitor the testing over many
iterations, as illustrated in Fig. 6. Commands are sent to the
IP/MPLS routers using Secure Shell (SSH) to configure the
CESs with different settings, and to repeatedly disable then re-
enable the CESs. The open source “rapid61850” library [2],
[28], which supports the Python programming language, is
embedded within the script to decode received the GOOSE
trip messages. The GOOSE messages could be sent directly by
the protection relays, rather than the RTDS, but this approach
enables integration of legacy relays which do not support IEC
61850 communications. To significantly speed up the process
over many iterations, the SSH commands to each edge router
are executed in parallel in separate threads. In all results given
in this paper, the IEEE C37.94 “n” value, which corresponds
to the number of 64 kbps slots being used, is set to n = 1.
D. Method 1: Static Asymmetrical Paths
Table II compares the theoretical tasyn values (calculated using
Eq. (4)) to values obtained by real-time testing with static
asymmetrical paths. The total Ethernet frame latency (calcula-
ted from the difference between the hardware time-stamping of
egress and ingress times) can be conveniently monitored using
the xCORE development software. The level of asymmetry
can also be estimated by monitoring the differential current
calculated by the each protection relay. The experimental
measurements are close to the theoretical values; the difference
can be attributed to the inherent inaccuracy of the ping-pong
algorithm implementation used by the protection relays which
has an error of approximately 0.1 ms (in ideal conditions).
E. Method 2: Real-Time Ethernet Jitter Injection
The network impairment generator, implemented using the
xCORE platform and illustrated in Fig. 6, has been configured
to apply additional latency to the packet flow in each direction,
according to a Gaussian distribution. This allows jitter, ac-
cording to the defined statistical distribution, to be “injected”
into the Ethernet link carrying teleprotection traffic. Fig. 7
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Fig. 6: Overview of automated process used for validation
Fig. 7: Example packet latency injection profile
illustrates a typical packet latency distribution. The random
latency is applied independently for each direction of traffic.
Other distributions could also be applied, but the important
point is not the shape of the latency distribution; instead, it
is only required that, during the laboratory experiments, the
presence of some jitter triggers asymmetry during initialisation
of the de-jitter buffers.
Table III provides the results for a selection of test con-
figurations with different parameters. To illustrate the effect
of asymmetry, a sensitive setting value of k1 = 0% has been
used. Although this value is impractical, it has been chosen
deliberately to ensure that the method described in Section
IV was tested under extremely undesirable conditions, and
to prove that maloperations do occur without this method
enabled. For each test, 100 iterations have been executed to
force re-initialization of the de-jitter buffers. In all tests, the
jitter is significant enough to result in some false trips. To
reiterate, this is caused by instantaneous jitter causing the de-
jitter buffers to be initialized incorrectly when the CES is
activated, as described in Section II-B. It is important to note
that there is a degree of chance involved, which is why many
iterations need to be performed, as summarised in Table III.
Furthermore, even if a false trip does not occur instantly upon
starting the teleprotection service, the de-jitter buffers may be
initialized into a degraded state which makes the teleprotection
service more susceptible to maloperation due to other factors
(such as charging current or CT saturation). There are many
options when configuring a teleprotection CES; the results in
Table III highlight that the de-jitter buffer size and the MPLS
payload size options do not significantly affect the probability
of false trips.
Note that to test this phenomenon in isolation, the de-jitter
buffers must be large enough to be able to absorb the worst-
case jitter after the teleprotection service has been initialized;
otherwise the service may fail due to the separate issue of
de-jitter buffer under-run or over-run, which would distort the
results.
F. Probability of Protection Maloperation
The method given in [21] can be used to calculate the
probability of false trips during teleprotection service initia-
lization, with the results given in Fig. 8a (for k1 = 0%) and
Fig. 8b (for k1 = 30%). With k1 = 0%, the protection scheme
is highly susceptible to false trips caused by packet jitter. Fig.
8b highlights that, even for typical protection setting values,
a moderate jitter with std. dev. of 1 ms can result in a 20%
probability of false trips during CES initialization; however,
note that jitter of 1 ms would exceed the existing guidelines
described in Section II-C. The slight mismatch between the
theoretical probabilities and the experimental results given
in Table III can be attributed to the measured propagation
time error (as noted in Section III-D) and the fact that only
1000 samples are used, resulting in a non-perfect normal
distribution, as illustrated in Fig. 7.
IV. SOLUTION TO COMPENSATE FOR ASYMMETRICAL
LATENCY
A feature called Asymmetrical Delay Control (ADC) [7]
has been developed for IP/MPLS networks to directly address
the main issue presented in this paper. ADC analyses the
behavior of traffic entering and leaving de-jitter buffers over
time. ADC can therefore adjust the de-jitter buffer residency
time accordingly to compensate for deviations from the correct
value. Specifically, if the mean measured residency time with
a de-jitter buffer is different from the engineered value, a
byte is dropped from or added to the data stream, which
brings the buffers in each direction into alignment. This
will cause one relay message to fail a Cyclic Redundancy
Check, and be discarded. However, relays typical tolerate
a 25% loss of messages within a 100 ms window before
the differential scheme starts running in a “Degraded Mode”
with a consequent latency applied to the tripping time [14];
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TABLE III: Results for real-time testing using Method 2
Fixed
latency (ms)
Variable latency
mean (ms)
Variable latency
std. dev. (ms)
De-jitter buffer
size (ms)
MPLS payload
size (bytes)
Theoretical probability
of false trip (%) (see
Section III-F)
Recorded false trip
occurrence (%)
1 3 0.3 10 32 28 28
1 3 0.3 16 32 28 19
1 3 0.3 10 16 28 20
1 3 0.3 16 16 28 33
1 3 0.5 10 32 52 46
1 3 0.5 16 32 52 53
1 3 0.5 10 16 52 51
1 3 0.5 16 16 52 47
1 3 1 10 32 75 74
1 3 1 16 32 75 76
1 3 1 10 16 75 65
1 3 1 16 16 75 58
(a) For k1 = 0% (not a practical value) (b) For k1 = 30%
Fig. 8: Theoretical probability of false trip during various jitter characteristics
therefore adding or dropping one byte will not disrupt the
protection functionality.
Method 2 (see Section III-E) has been repeated for a wide
variety of CES configurations, but with the ADC feature
enabled. In all cases, there were no false trips during buffer
initialization, regardless of the jitter profile applied, and the
protection function remained stable (unlike the results given
in Table III). This provides strong evidence that it is possible
to avoid the disruptive effects of jitter by carefully managing
the CES buffering process.
V. CONCLUSIONS
This paper has provided the first clear explanation of the
issues of asymmetrical latency for teleprotection services in
modern packet-based networks, backed by theoretical analysis
and real-time demonstration with actual substation hardware.
A novel and cost-effective approach for manipulating WAN
traffic in real-time has been used to validate the contributions
of the paper and quantify the risk of protection malopera-
tion for various sets of circumstances and parameter values.
Although the issues presented in this paper can be resolved
through dissemination of a high-quality timing reference, e.g.
using PTP, this is not practical or cost-effective in many si-
tuations. Legacy protection relays with TDM-based interfaces
must continue to be supported by utilities for many years.
This work will help utilities to quantify requirements for
teleprotection services in various configurations, and deter-
mine the risk of maloperation. One of the key findings is that
jitter is a significant issue during the initialization of a CES
over packet-based networks, and the buffers associated with
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a CES must be carefully monitored and adjusted. Although
protection relays may not (falsely) trip immediately following
initialization of the CES, the asymmetry caused by misaligned
de-jitter buffers will make the protection more sensitive to
other sources of error leading to apparent asymmetry, such
the circuit charging current; this may cause a false trip at a
later time.
The following recommendations can be made:
• This issue will not occur in all networks, but should be
considered if part of the packet-based WAN infrastructure
is delivered over TDM links or if there is any other factor
which can result in packet jitter.
• If there is significant variation in load current over time,
particularly if the load current is expected to be below
the Is2 setting, there is increased susceptibility to false
trips due to asymmetry. The protection settings could be
revised to avoid this situation, but this may affect the
protection sensitivity.
• In networks with the potential for significant jitter, it
is prudent to ensure that—in addition to the proper
configuration of QoS and traffic engineering—the buf-
fers associated with CES for teleprotection are managed
correctly (as shown in Section IV) to avoid degraded,
asymmetrical states.
• It is important that system integration testing explicitly
forces re-initialization of the teleprotection CES many
times, whilst monitoring the differential current reported
by protection relays—ideally using field testing with the
actual deployment network—to verify the potential for
this issue.
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